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Abstract:
Given the remit of addressing the potential of “worlded” comparative literature, I raise here two principal questions. 
First,  the importance of history in reading intertexts, or the historicity of the reception of texts (a reception which is 
often shielded by a penumbra of ignorance from those for whom the text was “intended” or from those who are the 
object  of interest of a particular text), for in the shade of parallel but distinct trajectories of history yet  further 
meaning is  produced. Texts discussed include the poetry of  Byron in the context  of its  reception in China,  the 
Chinese ballad Mulan, and its détournement by Disney.  The second reflection is on the nature of the impact of the 
“global” on literary and cultural studies, and on the meaning of global or world cultural production; a consideration 
of this seemingly new “worldly” culture also obliging us to invoke the historicity of this concept. In discussing these 
two areas, I tangentially seek to broach my discomfort with the metaphors with which we imagine and write literary 
and cultural studies.
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Comme nous donnons notre attention à un objet nous pouvons le donner à deux à la fois…. La  
comparaison n’est donc qu’une double attention. 
Condillac, Logique, I,7.
Except in France, where I write this article and where the discipline remains firmly anchored in 
the comparison of European high literatures and where incidentally the popularity of Derrida and 
Foucault remains quite relative, comparative literary studies at the end of the twentieth-century 
evolved in multiple and overlapping ways, sometimes sheltering behind the mantle of CompLit 
and sometimes brazenly shedding its mask. In a positive sense, comparative literature has enabled 
post-modern theorizing, the development of cultural studies, the inclusion of film studies in what 
was once a purely literary domain, and the writing of comparative cultural histories. It could be 
argued that comparative literature has ceded its place to a more generous schema of  “global 
literary studies”.  On the level of tolerance and openness, global literary studies gives, at least, the 
chance to study and discuss marginal and “hybrid” literatures. 1
However, within the framework of the “global” (and in French there is a nice distinction 
between global in the sense of “general”, and mondial relating to the totality of the earth, leading 
to the English globalization being translated as mondialisation) it would be a mistake to lose sight 
of the specifity and possibility for difference afforded by the comparative, for the comparative 
resists  totalization.  The Greek  eikon (translated  similitude in  Latin)  underlines  the difference 
between metaphor and simile. Eikon, or image, what is similar, the simile, the likeness, was for 
Quintillius, explained by comparatio, what happens in a simile, the difference emerging from the 
parallel, the parallel-difference. Thus, similitude/simile maintains the difference, the like prevents 
total assimilation, while it may be argued the global-globality (the general, generalized) tends to 
efface it.
Given  this  caveat,  the  notion  of  a  possible  “worlded”  comparative  literature  makes 
possible several vectors for enquiry. I am particularly attracted by the fact that the editors of this 
special issue of Gramma have privileged both the “pathways it has opened up and the ones it has 
foreclosed  or  left  unexplored”.  For  me  these  pathways  are  crossed,  interweaved  and 
superimposed. The importance of the past, and ways of remembering and telling it are central to 
1 One of the paradoxes of French intellectual life, anchored as it is in a hegemonic, centralized education system, is 
that while much of the theory used in this domain emanates from French intellectuals (Castoriadis, Deleuze, 
Foucault, Derrida – all considered as philosophers in France albeit largely excluded from philosophy syllabi) its 
impact on traditional French critical production has been minimal. Similarly, the impact of postcolonial theory (for 
example, the work of Fanon and Césaire - both Martiniquais and thus French colonial subjects,  and Edward Saïd, 
translated into French in 1980 with a preface by Tzvetan Todorov) on the French academic world remains much 
more measured than in the Anglophone world. Indeed, any map of the sphere of influence and practice of cultural 
and postcolonial studies could hardly be made to include France.
any future for a new sort of comparative field; similarly the relationship of time to space, and the 
often simplistic paradigms with which we attempt to conceptualize and imagine the temporal-
spatial conjunctures, demand to be re-thought. No question we may “choose” to address can 
escape this necessity. The function of the temporal in the constitution of parallel-difference must 
not be ignored, as it often has been in traditional comparative literary and philosophical studies.
If there remains a connexion between the traditional conception of Comparative Literature 
and global literary studies it would without doubt be the importance given to intertextuality, a 
relationship between texts that cannot be imagined outside of history. A good example of such 
historicity,  and this is just  one of many examples that could be given of the function of the 
intertext  in  Asian cultural  consumption  and production,  would be  the historical  reception of 
George Gordon Byron  (1788-1824). That Byron’s work should have its place in Anglo-Greek 
comparative literary history,  that  the English aristocrat  should still  be a  mythic figure in the 
Greek national imaginary, is comprehensible to the European reader. But why should Byron be 
lauded by the Chinese reader ? 
At  first  sight  the  Chinese  attraction  to  Byron  seems  misplaced,  even  perverse.  The 
Chinese,  and  similarly  the  Japanese,  fascination  with  the  Other’s  literary  practice  was  real 
enough. But  Asian interest  in European textual  practice,  which developed in  the mid to  late 
nineteenth century, did not centre on English-language poetic production, so closely associated in 
the radical intellectual’s mind with European colonialism. Rather, the object of poetic desire was 
for the most part with French free verse. 
While in Europe and America pre-modern, « classical », Chinese poetry was avidly read 
and reworked by Anglophone translators and poets - the translations of Arthur Waley  (1889-
1969)  and Kenneth Rexroth (1905-1982) being of a prime importance in the literary construction 
of a mythic, ancient, exotic and Othered China - in China, the would-be intellectual class sought 
to  understand  foreign  modernity;  from  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  novelists  such  as 
Dickens, and even more popular writers such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (as author of Sherlock 
Holmes) were translated and appreciated for the critical insight into Western industrial world that 
they offered. 
In the domain of poetry, the exponents of China’s New Poetry sought a total liberation 
from the shackles of constraint imposed by the classical  Chinese poetic mode. Inventors and 
practitioners of the New Poetry in the main looked to the emancipatory possibilities of the vers 
libre of  nineteenth-century French symbolism, and to the revolutionary passion of Mayakovsky 
(1893-1930) and Esenin  (1895 - 1925). Unlike most of their contemporaries two major poetic 
figures of the first half of the twentieth century (what is often called the Republican period), Xu 
Zhimo (1896 –1931) and Wen Yiduo (1899-1946) were attracted to the more ordered and orderly 
romanticism of nineteenth-century English verse. 
But,  Byron figured only belatedly in the pantheon of Xu Zhimo’s poetic  models,  the 
Chinese poet only translating his English predecessor’s Corsair (1814) in 1924.2 But already, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century,  Byron was considered in China to be not only a poetic 
reference, but a great man, a hero. We know that the Greeks have greatly admired him for the 
support, more effectual on the moral rather than military plane, that he lent to their struggle for 
sovereignty. Upon  the news of his demise the Greeks declared a three-week period of national 
mourning for this peer of the British realm who had clearly pushed to the fore in his poems and in 
his speeches his disgust with the policies of his own country from which since his youth he had 
continuously sought to distance himself.  But why should the Chinese so many decades later, 
discover a hero in the person of Lord Byron, who had never set foot outside of Europe and had 
never consecrated a single line to China ?
2 Xiaoshuo yuebao, 15:4.
The answer lies  in the history of the nineteenth century,  and more particularly in the 
history of imperialism, and the nationalist, anti-colonialist reaction to it. Greece had long been 
subjected to rule by a foreign dynastic empire, and China’s last dynasty, the Qing, that of the 
Manchus,  had  imposed  its  rule  by  force.  Greece,  was  perceived  by  Chinese  intellectuals  as 
resembling China in that it was the successor to an ancient civilization that had been subjugated 
to  foreign  domination  and  was  now  confronting  the  challenge  of  Western  modernity. 
Furthermore, that Byron had supported the Greeks in their struggle for independence from the 
Ottoman  Empire  could  not  fail  to  impress  and  inspire  the  Chinese  reformers.  China  was 
threatened and invaded by foreigners, in particular by the British, and that a son of the British 
ruling  class  should  support  those  who  had  resisted  colonialist  oppression  could  not  but  be 
appreciated by an intellectual class in search of an alternative modernity with a more human and 
humane face. 
But the reason for Byron’s enthusiastic reception in a China faced with the high tide of 
British imperialist  ambition,  is perhaps yet more complex than a  straightforward approval of 
Byron’s  alliance  with  Greeks  independantists,  of  his  defence  of  the  marginalized,  colonized 
subject. Two nineteenth-century events connected by the role of one British ruling family, yet 
separated  in  space  and time by  six  decades  and a  whole  continent,  are  both  well-known to 
millions of Chinese readers; yet only one of these is embedded in Greek national consciousness. 
The first event dates back to 26 December 1801. I refer to the beginning of the dismantling of the 
Parthenon Marbles by Thomas Bruce, Seventh Earl of Elgin (1766-1841). Elgin would attempt to 
justify the pillage by opining that both Turks and Greeks were indifferent to the conservation of 
the monument and that marbles would be put to better use as a source of inspiration for English 
artists  in  London.  Despite  years  of  Greek  campaigning,  what  became  known as  the  “Elgin 
marbles” still langour there in the custody of the British Museum. It is a well-known story of 
brazen colonialist disdain for the modern “Oriental” Other deemed incapable of comprehending 
or demonstrating concern for past cultural traditions and objects.
The second event took place sixty years later, when another Elgin, James Bruce, 8th Earl 
of Elgin  (1811—1863), the son of he who had purloined the Parthenon, in order to punish the 
Manchu court for its refusal to allow Western embassies access to the capital, ordered British and 
French forces to sack the imperial  summer palace,  the Yuanmingyuan, in Beijing; an act  of 
vandalism famously condemned by Victor Hugo who wrote of “one theft with two thieves”. The 
23,000 sculptures and relics surviving the pillage of Anglo-French rank and file soldiers are also 
now located in  London’s British Museum. But the sacking was but a spectacular sideshow, an 
adjunct to the main objective which was to impose European economic and political hegemony, 
and to occupy whatever territory necessary in order so to do. In 1860, at the conclusion of this 
“Second Opium War”, a war to assure continued, unimpeded British importation of opium into 
China, Britain obtained Kowloon opposite Hong Kong Island (already acquired in 1842).  In 
1898 the so-called New Territories, contiguous to Kowloon, were obtained on a ninety-nine year 
lease. This fifty-fold increase in the size of Britain’s foothold in China was a small affair for the 
world’s largest and most powerful imperialist giant, but it constituted a further chapter in the 
story of China’s humiliation. Three years later, in 1902, with the fall of China’s last imperial 
dynasty still a decade away, the great reformer and scholar Liang Qichao, who saw nineteenth-
century European novels as a force for socio-political reform and encouraged their emulation, 
translated segments of two major poems of Byron,  Childe Harold (1811) and  Don Juan, for 
inclusion in his grand, yet unfinished, futuristic, utopian novel Xin Zhongguo weilaiji (The story 
of the future of New China) in which he imagined the China of 1962. One of the fragments 
translated was the now familiar excerpt from the second canto of Childe Harold’s Piligrimage :
Dull is the eye that will not weep to see 
Thy walls defaced, thy mouldering shrines removed 
By British hands, which it had best behoved 
To guard those relics ne'er to be restored. 
Curst be the hour when from their isle they roved, 
And once again thy hapless bosom gored, 
And snatch'd thy shrinking gods to northern climes abhorred!
(Byron 197)
Other translations rapidly followed. In 1905, Ma Junwu (1881-1940) and Huang Kan (1886－
1935) independently translated into Chinese the “Isles of Greece” section of the third canto of 
Don Juan  as “Ode to Greece”. It is in the latter that is found the plaint of Byron in favour of the 
Greeks, and their heritage:
To feel at least a patriot’s shame
Even as I sing, suffuse my face ;
For what is left the poet here ?
For Greeks a blush, for Greece a tear.
(Byron 695)
Clearly the Chinese translators chose those passages that foregrounded the struggle for 
national autonomy, the renaissance of a country once grandiose and glorious, and the shame of 
the (British) poet in the face of his compatriots’ actions. For the Chinese reader of the early 
twentieth century, and in objective historical terms, the words penned by Byron had become even 
heavier with meaning. British imperialism had entered a new expansionist and territorialist phase 
and its ideological disdain for the Other, especially the Other of colour, knew few bounds. The 
China that had had little to fear from British marauders at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
when  Elgin  chose  to  desecrate  the  Parthenon,  a  century  later  when  Byron’s  words  were 
translated, was now weak and fragmented into ‘spheres of influence’ controlled from the colony-
enclaves of the European powers, and had escaped full-scale territorial colonization only because 
Britain  wished  to  maintain  hegemonic  power  in  China,  a  dominance  that  would  have  been 
rendered  difficult  by  a  cartographic  division  of  the  Manchu  Empire  into  physical  foreign 
‘possessions’.
In  1906  and  1908,  the  celebrated  literati  and  translator  Su  Manshu  (1884-1918 ） 
published two volumes of translations containing versions of Byron’s poems (Hu 134). There 
then followed commentaries on the poems. One such was written by a man who would become 
modern China’s great mythic author and revolutionary figure, Lu Xun (1881-1936). Writing in 
1907 out of a poetic tradition that spanned more than two millennia, Lu Xun declared Byron’s 
poetry was infused with the “ power of enormous waves crashing down directly on the columns 
of  the  old  society”  (Lu  1907).  In  other  words,  Lu  Xun  apprehended  a  poetry  of  critique 
interrogative  of  empires  and  feudal  systems.  Byron’s  poetry  spoke  clearly  to  a  young  élite 
Chinese  generation  which  sought  the  fall  of  the  Manchu  empire,  the  restitution  of  China’s 
autonomy, and the disappearance of foreign occupying powers.   Lu Xun resumed his sentiment 
thus: “His words resound with resistance” (Lu 1907).
Another major intellectual figure, Liang Shiqiu (1902-1987), spoke of Byron’s style as a 
“poetic revolution”. In 1914, Hu Shi (1891-1962) , scholar, pedagogue, diplomat and pioneer of 
China’s New Poetry movement published his translation of “Ode to Greece” (Hu 150-165). Hu, 
more reformer than revolutionary, noted Byron’s relatively mediocre literary stature in the eyes 
of his compatriots, and identifying the reason for his renown in his political stance: “Although 
Byron may be placed in the second water of England’s literature, his political reputation abroad 
far surpasses that of other English poets” (Hu 136). Shelley had yet to be translated in China but 
would soon join Byron in the Chinese revolutionary intellectual imaginary, especially after the 
launching  of  the  4th May 1919 intellectual  revolution,  a  literary  and cultural  reaction  to  the 
marginalization of China in the Versailles peace talks.3 The revolutionary cultural fervour that 
3 China an ally of Britain and France had sent men to Europe during World War One. They were incorporated into 
the British Army’s  Chinese Labour Corps ; it was they who dug the trenches in France. China thus hoped to, at least, 
followed this post-Great War reminder of China’s subaltern status, drew the young intellectual 
elite even closer to Byron. Lu Xun, decades after having first written of Byron, attempting to 
explain  Chinese  admiration  for  the  poet,  stated  clearly  that  “it  was  his  support  for  Greek 
independence. With the decline of the Qing [Manchu] empire, a section of China’s youth, full of 
the ideas of  revolution, revenge and resistance found their inspiration in the poetry of Byron” 
(Lu 1926). After the rise to national power of the Communists in 1949, New China continued to 
render  homage  to  Byron.  This  admiration  was  formulated  within  a  national,  revolutionary 
imaginary,  yet it  demanded an assemblage of layers of acquaintance with Greek history and 
culture,  ancient  and  modern,  of   knowledge  of  the  politico-historical  role  of  Byron,  the 
aristocratic youth who dared to denounce British imperialism and its hooligan manners, a parallel 
reading of British intrusions into Greece and in China, and finally a desire to emulate in both 
writing and action this  poet  resistant who succeeded in  motivating a  generation and a  class 
distanced from Byron in time and in space, but drawn close to him by a long moment of history - 
perpetuated by British imperialism and the anti-colonialist reaction – and a common yearning for 
autonomy.
Today such autonomy seems imperilled by the advance of the global. Globalization as  an 
economic  tendency,  as  a  political  strategy,  as  a  dominant  ideology,  as  a  discourse  of 
hypermodernity,  as  the  bogeyman  of  the  globophobic,  is  now  firmly  entrenched  in  our 
imaginaries as the inescapably seductive driving force of the twenty-first  century. But is this 
process  of  international  economic,  and  thus  cultural,  harmonization,  standardization  and 
homogenisation so modern?
have sovereignty restored over its German occupied territories (such as Qingdao – Tsingtao), but these were 
transferred to Japan, also an ally. Students demonstrated at Tiananmen. The demonstration was violently suppressed 
by the authorities. A list of  names of English officers of the Chinese Labour Corps, together with the medals  they 
were attributed, may be found on the website of the Public Record Office. There is no Chinese name listed.
The discourse  of  globalization,  in  reality,  has  been  recuperated  from already existent 
analyses of processes of internationalisation and homogenisation, it has been  détourné, as the 
French has it. The verb  détourner is difficult to translate into English (“hijack” is quite close, 
“divert” too neutral). Indeed, a “hijack” in French is a  détournement, and Guy Debord and the 
Situationists advocated just such a “hijacking” of texts and language. More recently, politicians 
and  marketing  strategists  have  détourné the  concept  of  globalization.  And  yet  even  their 
recuperated sense of globalization is not so distant from a much more well-established vision of 
this  process.  But  since  when  have  we  been  theorizing  globalization?  Let  us  examine  the 
following text:
The  bourgeoisie  has  through  its  exploitation  of  the  world  market  given  a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.…it has 
drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All 
old  established  national  industries  have  been  destroyed  or  are  daily  being 
destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, … industries whose products 
are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of 
the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, 
requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands….In place of the old 
local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every 
direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in 
intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become 
common  property.  National  one-sidedness  and  narrow-mindedness  become 
more  and  more  impossible,  and  from  the  numerous  national  and  local 
literatures, there arises a world literature.
The  words  just  cited  were  written  over  a  century  and  half  ago.  They  are  taken  from  the 
Communist Manifesto, published in 1848 (Marx 83-84). It is not immediately evident whether 
Marx and Engels consider this march towards a global economy and culture as positive, but the 
sense of the words that follow is quite clear:
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by 
the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all … nations into 
civilisation.…It  compels  all  nations,  on  pain  of  extinction,  to  adopt  the 
bourgeois  mode  of  production;  it  compels  them  to  introduce  what  it  calls 
civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, 
it creates a world after its own image (Marx 84).
Already over 150 years ago Marx saw economic globalization as an inevitable process, but did he 
foresee the (post-modern) commodification of intellectual and cultural production? Even if Marx 
understood the logic  of  capitalism,  which evidently  he did better  than anyone,  he could not 
predict the emergence of a post-bourgeois capitalist economy and the concomitant hypermodern 
economic colonization of culture and language.
For Marx and Engels, true internationalists, at least in a white Euro-American dimension, 
who transposed and introduced ideas and lexical innovations from one European language to 
another,  the  internationalization  of  the  work  and  product  of  the  intellectual  could  only  be 
beneficial to progressive forces. 
They were right in foreseeing and predicting economic and intellectual globalization, but 
since the transformation in power relations expected by Marx and Engels did not happen, or did 
not  happen  as  they  expected,  the  globalization  of  intellectual,  cultural  and  informational 
production and distribution has now fallen totally under the hegemony of the economic.
Nevertheless, the representational strategy of regnant authority identified by Marx and 
Engels remains fundamentally similar. The national bourgeois economy may have been replaced 
by networks of global economic power, but the “new” form of power still  deploys the same 
modus operandi: “it creates a world in its own image” (Marx 84).
But  let  us  not  be  mistaken,  Marx  did  not  condemn  economic  or  intellectual 
“cosmopolitanization”, as he called it. The world needed to be pulled out of its feudal misery, the 
town must replace the country, Nature must be mastered. While not categorically hostile to the 
local,  Marx  and  Engels  did  not  regret  its  demise,  since  the  new  global  hegemony  of  the 
proletariat had first to traverse the historical phase of  the centralizing nation-state. 
As often with Marx and Engels, their discourse is contradictory, or at least now it so 
seems  at the beginning of the twenty-first century, for they are at once critical of the brutality of 
the bourgeoisie, and yet in awe of the progress inherent in the advance of bourgeois national and 
international  capitalist  modernization.  Let  me  cite  one  last  paragraph  from  the  Communist  
Manifesto, a text that oozes disdain for the marginal and the unmodern and which contains a 
famously disparaging dismissal of the peasant way of life. It is also a text that shows the acute 
analytical prowess of Marx in its prediction of the twentieth century economic, but also cultural, 
balance of power:
The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created 
enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with 
the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the 
idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it 
has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries  dependent  on  the  civilised 
ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West (Marx 
84).
In this extract from The Communist Manifesto  we are confronted at once with the full power of 
Marx’s  critical  capacities  and  at  the  same  time  with  an  engrained  Hegelian  disdain  for  the 
assumed backwardness and decadence of the “Orient”. Here, Marx, like Hegel, establishes an 
equivalence  between  what  is  termed  “rural  idiocy”,  and  the  presumed  ignorance  and 
backwardness of the East. Such historically ill-founded prejudices are still sadly entrenched, a 
century and half later, in the post-colonial, yet still deeply colonialist, European imaginary of the 
Other, and above all the Oriental Other.
But  while Marx and Engels may have been unable to foresee the evolutive nature of 
consumer capitalism, post World War II “alternative” theorists such as Cornelius Castoriadis and 
the even more marginal, although latterly deified, Guy Debord were not only able to theorize and 
predict  the development of the economic but  also the ways in which political  power and its 
representations would evolve.4
Guy Debord, in his now celebrated and oft recuperated theory of  société spectaculaire, 
“society of the spectacle”, analysed the nature of alienation in twentieth-century modern society.5 
While frequently understood as a critique of the manipulation of the image in modern society, the 
Society of the Spectacle goes well beyond analysing the relatively restrained sphere of the mass 
media.  Debord  focuses  on  the  impoverishment  of  daily  lived  experience,  and  the  increasing 
alienation and fragmentation of human existence.  The spectacle,  the sum of the independent 
images and representations provided by modernity, then serves as a substitute for real and whole 
experience of life. Individuals separated from one another in everyday life find unity only in the 
passive contemplation of the image, modern substitute for religion. Of course, the core problem is 
not image and representation but the society that has need of them. For Debord there were two 
types of spectacle in the 1950s, the diffuse, represented by the “liberal democracies” providing 
the illusion of choice, and the concentrated, constituted by the authoritarian model (the Soviet 
bloc, China, Indonesia) in which the spectacle is focussed on a quasi-religious leader. Later, in an 
analysis  which  foresaw the  fall  of  the  wall,  Commentaries  on  the  Society  of  the  Spectacle 
published in 1988, Debord located what he called the “integrated spectacle” into which the two 
systems had started to merge and to recuperate  features the one from the other.  This “post-
communist” phase of the “integrated spectacle” in which in terms of representation the New 
World Order replaced the Cold war, is what is now represented as globalization.
4 Cornelius Castoriadis, radical French theorist of Greek origin, moved gradually, over a period of twenty years 
starting in the immediate post-World War Two period, from a neo-Trotskyist critique of Soviet bloc communism to a 
fundamental  critique  of  Marx’s  historical  determinism.  In  particular,  he  ultimately  demonstrates  that  Marx 
extrapolates  to  the  whole  of  history ways of  thinking that  are  appropriate  and  applicable  only  to  Marx’s  own 
historical  era,  subsumes the  diversity  of  global  social  forms under a  schema making sense only for  developed 
capitalist  society.  For  a  good  analytical  summary  of  Castoriadis’s  work  see :  Poirier,  N.  (2004),  Castoriadis :  
L’imaginaire radical, Paris : PUF.
5 But importantly the French word spectacle also translates as “show”, as in cabaret or theatre.
But while for Debord, writing between the 1960s and the 1980s, globalization, or what he 
perceived as the increasing homogenization of the integrated spectacle, constituted the emerging 
ideological formation of the waning twentieth century, the national-level manifestation of the 
spectacle with its national consumable politician/pop-idol heroes was still very much present on 
the ideological  stage.  And yet,  is  such  an  imbrication  of  the  national  and  the  global  not  in 
contradiction with the national’s supposed contestation of global hegemonic power? 
I  think not.  Despite all  the “faith” invested in the liberating impulse and potential  of 
national revolutions, has not the national hemmed us in to a lower order totalization, a sort of 
sub-globalization of culture  in  both its  aesthetic  and wider  senses?   While  modern national 
cultures, invented and reinvented in and around nationalizing projects like modern Greece’s and 
modern China’s, were constructed and imagined in opposition to a process that for much of the 
twentieth century was known, not as globalization, but as cultural imperialism, national cultures 
themselves  were  already  standardizing  constructs  applying  unifying  cultural  practices,  and 
eliminating linguistic and other diversities. In other words, the national literatures that we have 
for decades compared in conventional comparative literature departments were already totalizing 
entities whose consequence, if not always their objective, was to binarize and thus minimize, and 
often altogether eradicate,  the very differences comparatism ought to seek to foreground and 
value. 
 If, even in the era of the global, the national continues to exist it is because national 
projects have not yet run their course as Marx envisaged they would and that the hour of “world 
literature” has not arrived.  The national continues to prosper on the territory of global commerce 
in  the  sense  that  because  the  unifying  force  of  distribution  and  consumption  serves  a  local 
purpose, it has become the great leveller, the grand homogenizer of national space. What matters 
is not what is consumed but the pattern of homogenised consumption, what matters is that what is 
consumed is consumed nationally,  for instance,  all  over China – or for the moment all  over 
modernized China.  For local holders of power this is the global at the service of the national. The 
standardisation of distribution and consumption advances and  completes the project of national 
cultural assimilation, a project launched much later in Asia than in Europe.  So that, ultimately, 
this is why Starbucks is in Beijing’s Forbidden City and McDonalds in every town worth the 
name in China. McDonaldization is the final phase, the accomplishment, of nationalization in the 
ex-Third World, and glocalization, what we can also term Asterixisation (promoting American 
burgers  with  French  cartoon  characters),  renders  this  process  even  more  recuperable  to  the 
national project. Thus, the tentacles of a nineteenth-century process of modernization and nation-
state building reaching down into contemporary hypermodern globality.
Marx envisaged the  generalization of  a  nineteenth-century  bourgeois  culture  which  is 
what in part took place. But that has now been overtaken by the technologies and practices of 
mass spectacular consumption. Moreover, we are far removed from any sort of utopian exchange 
of literary and cultural diversities. The cultural is embedded in the economic and must obey its 
“laws”. Was China’s acceptance into the world economic system achieved by integrating the 
World  Trade  Organisation,  or  by  Disney’s  producing  Mulan™; a  fourteen-hundred  year  old 
Chinese tale which became an American registered trademark? 
Given white America’s history of distrust and even hatred of the Chinese, why at the end 
of the twentieth-century did Disney-America choose to make their “Chinese” cartoon film? Is it 
simply,  as Byrne and McQuillan claim, that Disney in making this  film wished primarily to 
please the Chinese authorities so as to benefit from the vast potential of a market soon to open its 
doors wide to the World Trade Organisation (163-165). And why did Disney choose to re-tell this 
story (of a dutiful daughter who secretly takes her father’s place in the imperial Chinese army so 
as to defend the state from the invading foreigners)? After all the plot, until Disney had nuanced 
it,  was not a typical Disney historico-mythic love story. The original Chinese tale, or ballad, 
which first circulated around fifteen hundred years ago and was retold in many forms (lyric, 
theatrical and narrative) over the subsequent centuries, stressed the lack of importance of gender 
as long as the task in hand was accomplished:
For twelve years the warriors had campaigned together
None suspected that Mulan was a woman
The male rabbit jumps, and the female blinks
When they run side by side
How can you tell which is which? 6
But Disney’s redeployed and recuperated Mulan, was easily assimilated into a Euro-American 
tradition that still venerated Joan of Arc, and yet now sought glocalized models for late twentieth-
century  American  “multiculturalism”.  However,  Disney’s  admittance  of  Chineseness  into  its 
cartoon stable forgets the long struggle of Chinese and Japanese Americans for recognition of 
their mistreatment at the hands of the US state and American society in general. That struggle for 
recognition started in 1960s and 1970s anti-Vietnam war Asian American alliances and led to the 
formation of an Asian American consciousness. The movement also led directly to the creation of 
university departments of Asian American studies established initially by writers and activists 
such as Shawn Wong and Lawson Inada and now largely, “professionalized” and occupied by 
“qualified” academics. The Disney representation of Americanized Chineseness, then, elides the 
history of nineteenth and twentieth-century legal exclusion of Chinese from immigration and 
American citizenship; the internment camps in which Japanese immigrants and American citizens 
of Japanese origin were indiscriminately imprisoned in the deserts of the American West during 
the Second World War after Pearl Harbour; and more recently the racism of the 1980s when the 
anger of US workers and their failing automobile industry was vented on unsuspecting Asian 
6 My translation of the last lines of  Mulanshi  (The Ballad of Mulan). The Chinese text is consultable on-line at 
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~dporter/sampler/huamulan.html
Americans. The importance of history to the reading of texts and intertexts, as I stressed at the 
beginning of this article, is nowhere more necessary than here. But if modern American history is 
suppressed, the representation of  Chinese history in this film once more reinscribes Orientalist 
and  Area  Studies  practices  of  conflating  all  the  “pre-modern”  into  a  monolithic  moment  of 
antiquity: in Mulan, pre-modern China becomes a seamless, static, ahistorical entity.
But again, if Mulan integrated easily, into the transnational cinema conglomerate’s global 
and globalizing strategy, alongside Jasmine, Snow White and the other Princesses of the Disney 
empire, it in no way offended official Chinese sensibilities, no more than it did the Chinese social 
imaginary. The neo-Confucian values that have been resurfacing in post-Mao China could only 
be  comforted   by  Mulan’s  return  to  the  parental  home  and  her  marriage  to  the  main  male 
character, “the reimposition of the patriarchal order at the end of the Disney film”  serving “to 
undo the liberating potential of its central female character” (Byrne 165). Or, as Disney’s own 
webpage has it, the film “celebrates honor, courage, and the importance of family”. 7
But  globality,  the  time-space that  all  of  us  today inhabit,  is  not  the  bright  uniformly 
coloured world with which cartoons, and globalization’s propaganda in general, presents us. The 
spectacle is stained and blotched with the inequalities and injustices of populations left behind, 
left  out,  left  struggling  underneath,  lost  in  the  folds  of  the  dimensional  computer-generated 
models and mind maps, and in the parentheses of post-modern academic discourse; sterilized and 
sanitized in the hegemony of the Greek suffixes that have reproduced themselves so intrusively in 
this article. The excluded are hidden in the caves, and under the crags, of the cliff-faces of a 
thousand plateaux, metaphorically yet literally, bookishly yet cynically, written into the margins 
of our discursive strategies. 
7  http://disneyvideos.disney.go.com/moviefinder/products/2296303.html 
And these dispossessed are not only the hundreds of millions of citizens of the BRICs, 
and the not yet BRICs, who have yet to benefit from any form of modern life, but also the host of 
forgotten post-colonized in our midst.8 The north African women who clean up after us after we 
lock our office doors at day’s end and leave behind the subalterns in the pages of our cultural 
studies manuals. As academics we stand scientifically, neutrally, helplessly on the sidelines of a 
world dominated by the market, analysing and at times even critiquing the New World Order, 
only to find our words subverted and recuperated by business and business-ologists. At worst we 
are ourselves turned into the mediators, the passers of socio-economic conflict that goes veiled in 
the grab of the so-called cultural. But as women and men of letters we should be capable of going 
beyond critique of the global, the local and the glocal, we should be capable of challenging the 
linguistic order within which we are all trapped, of contributing to a new poetics of a new world 
culture  which  -  as  that  bearded  white  male  bourgeois  radical,  Karl  Marx  -  predicted,  will 
inevitably come. But will that culture be no more than the globalized/glocalized homogenous 
product? Will our heroes be borrowed and shared, or will they be recuperated, marketed and 
sold? And will humankind be yet capable of turning and twisting the shabby soullessness of 
hypermodernity into a new poetry of everyday life? 
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